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In many cases where someone gains a Anancial beneAt at the 
expense of another person he or she is not aware that this gain 
is without legal ground and for that reason the beneAt should be 
handed over on the basis of unjustiAed enrichment law. The fate 
of the beneAt in the hands of the enriched party can be diSer-
ent; in particular it can be transferred to a third party, used up, 
discarded or lost in another way. It often turns out that when the 
impoverished party seeks the return of the beneAt it is impossi-
ble because of the loss of the enrichment. Contemporary law has 
special provisions on that situation. Under Polish law anyone who 
without legal grounds has gained a Anancial beneAt at the expense 
of another person is obliged to hand over the beneAt in kind, and if 
it is not possible, to return its value (art. 405 of the civil code). In 
the case of transfer, loss or damage, this obligation refers to what 
was obtained in exchange for the beneAt or as remedy of damage 
(art. 406 c.c.) and only when the enriched person has used the 
beneAt up or discarded it in good faith does he cease to be obliged 
to return it (art. 409 c.c.)1.
1 See: E. Łętowska, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie [Unjusti;ed enrichment],
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In this paper I analyse how that problem was solved in Roman 
law in cases where someone has transferred to a  third person 
a thing of another which he has previously received without legal 
ground2. I do not deal with all cases where the person ceases to 
be enriched (loss of the enrichment), but only with that particular 
problem.
Crucial and at the same time the most diBcult to interpret is C
a source of Roman law concerning the sale of another’s slave for 
a low price: D.12.6.26.12 (Ulp. 26 ad ed.) “et interdum licet aliud 
praestemus, inquit, aliud condicimus: ut puta fundum indebitum 
dedi et fructus condico: vel hominem indebitum, et hunc sine 
fraude modico distraxisti, nempe hoc solum refundere debes, quod 
ex pretio habes […]”.
It is an excerpt from a very long passage of Ulpian’s commentary 
to an edict which refers to the problem of restitution of a benePt in 
several diQerent cases, especially where a freedman does works for 
his patron (operae o&cialess  or operae fabriles)3, in the belief that 
he owes them. In all these cases Ulpian asks what the subject of 
the restitution should be and presents his and other jurists’ views 
in this regard. Of particular importance is the quotation of Celsus’ 
remark that interdum licet aliud praestemus, aliud condicimus, so it 
Warszawa 2000, pp. 126 Q.; P. Księżak, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie. Art. 405– 
–414 KC [UnjustiCed enrichment]. Art. 405–414 of the Polish civil code, Warszawa 
2007, pp. 143–165 with further literature mentioned there. 
2 I do not tackle here the problem if the phrase “without legal ground” is 
the proper way of describing the Roman concept of condictiones. On the discus-
sion of causa condictionis see recently: S. Hähnchen, Die causa condictionis. 
Ein Beitrag zum klassischen römischen kondiktionenrecht, Berlin 2003, passim; 
N. Jansen, Die Korrektur grundloser Vermögensverchiebungen als Restitution? 
Zur Lehre von der ungerechtfertigten Bereicherug bei Savigny, ZSS 120, 2003, 
pp. 106–182; M. Sobczyk, The problem of causa condictionis in the settlements 
of Roman jurists and in modern Polish unjustiCed enrichment law, “Studia Praw-
noustrojowe” 9, 2009, pp. 29–42. 
3 On this topic see: I. von Koschembahr-Lyskowski, Die Condictio als Be-
reicherungsklage im römischen Recht, vol. 1, Weimar 1903, pp. 43 Q.; idem, 
Die Condictio als Bereicherungsklage im römischen Recht, vol. 2, Weimar 1907, 
pp. 251 Q.; W. Waldstein, Zur Frage der condictio bei irrtümlicher Leistung 
nichtgeschuldeter operae, in: Iuris Professio. Festgabe für Max Kaser zum 80. 
Geburtstag, Wien–Köln–Graz 1986, pp. 319–330.
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does happen on occasion that we can bring a condictio for something 
di6erent from what we handed over. As a rule the plainti6 claims 
back that bene=t which he has handed over, but this rule is nei-
ther strict nor applicable in every situation. It often happens that 
the defendant is unable to restore the bene=t in kind, because he 
does not possess it yet. The jurist illustrates such a case with two 
examples: I give land not owed and bring a condictio for its fruits 
or I give a slave not owed, and you sell him honestly (sine fraude) 
for a small sum. In the case of land the possibility of demanding 
its fruits its obvious; however, this text should be understood in 
the way that not only the land itself must be given back but also 
its fruits and not in the way that the fruits are to be handed over 
instead of the land4. This rule is con=rmed in other sources5.
Much more complex is the second example mentioned by Ul-
pian – sale of a slave not owed sine fraude for a low price. The most 
diMcult part of the passage relates to the words quod ex pretio 
habes, which describe the extent of the obligation of restitution. 
Two aspects make it diMcult: =rst, Latin pretium can mean both 
“value” and “price”, second quod ex pretio habes can mean both 
“what you still have left from the price” or “what you have received 
as price”. As far as the =rst question is concerned the term “price” 
=ts more to the context of the fragment, because it refers to the 
contract of sale. The words modico distraxisti also refer more to 
the price than to the value of the slave. The second question is 
much more difficult. In the English translation of the Digest ed-
ited by Alan Watson this phrase is translated by Peter Birks as 
“you certainly need only give me back what you have left from the 
price”6, in. Charles Henry. Monro’s “all that you need return is so 
much of the purchase money as you still have got”7. In old German 
4 U. v. Lübtow, Beiträge zur Lehre von der condictio nach römischem und 
geltendem Recht. Studien zum römischem und geltendem Recht, Berlin 1952, 
pp. 53 6.
5 D.12.6.15pr. (Paul. 10 ad Sab.), D.12.6.65.5 (Paul. 17 ad Plaut.).
6 P. Birks, in: The Digest of Justinian. Translation, ed. A. Watson, vol. 1, 
Philadelphia 1985.
7 The Digest of Justinian, transl. Ch.H. Monro, vol. II, Cambridge 1909, 
p. 315. 
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translation it is: “du brauchst blos das wiederzugeben, was du vom 
Preise hast”8 and in the recent one: “was du vom Kaupreis noch 
hast”9. The Polish translation follows the same pattern: “czyż nie 
powinieneś zwrócić jedynie tego, co pozostało ci z ceny”10. All these 
translations take into consideration only one possibility: that the 
condictio-debtor has to return only what he has left from the price, 
so only remaining (still existing) enrichment at the time of litis con-
testatio. It is surprising that the alternative interpretation is not 
mentioned at all, even in references. In fact, this problem is not as 
simple as it seems to be after the reading of the Digest’s translation. 
Many diVerent views were presented in the Romanist literature 
on this issue. They can be classiXed in two groups, both corre-
sponding to the above-mentioned diVerent ways of interpretation 
of the Latin quod ex pretio habes. The opinion that this phrase 
means “what you have left from the price” is strongly supported 
by Ulrich. v. Lübtow in reference to Justinian law and with sharp 
contradiction to classical law. According to him this part of the 
passage is strongly reduced and interpolated. In its current word-
ing when someone in good faith sells a slave who was not owed 
for a low price, the owner of the slave can demand only the pro-
ceeds achieved as long as they still exist. It is compatible with the 
Byzantine theory of enrichment, but classical law was completely 
diVerent11. Lübtow argues that as a rule under classical law where 
someone obtained Xnancial beneXt without legal ground he was 
obliged to return the beneXt in kind or its value without any reduc-
tion, so the enrichment received, and he could not claim that his 
enrichment had shrunk or was lost before he was called to give it 
8 Das Corpus Iuris Civilis in’s Deutsche übersetzt von einem Vereine Rechts-
gelehrter und herausgegeben, von C. E. Otto, B. Schilling und C. F. F. Sintenis. 
Dritter Theil der Pandecten. Zwölftes und dreizehntes Buch. Übersetzt von 
M. R. Schneider unter der Redaction des C.E. Otto, Leipzig 1830, p. 64. 
9 Corpus Iuris Civilis. Digesten 11–20, Text und Übersetzung, ed. O. Behe-
rends, R. Knütel, B. Kupisch, H. H. Seiler, Heidelberg 1999.
10 Digesta Iustiniani. Digesta Justyniańskie. Tekst i przekład [Digest of Ju-
stinian. Text and translation], vol. III, books 12–19, ed. T. Palmirski, Kraków 
2014, p. 81.
11 U. Lübtow, op.cit., p. 54.
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back12. However, this obligation was limited to the price received 
by the seller acting in good faith where the price was lower than 
the objective value of the slave13. In Justinian law this obligation 
was further limited only to what the bonae &dei seller has left 
from the price, because by this amount he remained enriched at 
the time of litis contestatio. Such a solution was regarded as just 
and corresponded to the general Justinian unjustiCed enrichment 
concept14. The interpretation presented by Lübtow is based on the 
assumption of extensive interpolation of the source by Justinian 
compilers; the author even proposed a reconstruction of the original 
wording15. This view complies with the dominant opinion in the 
literature at the time of Lübtow’s work that in Justinian law the 
recipient of undue performance was obliged to hand over only the 
enrichment remaining at the time of the commencement of an ac-
tion16. However, it should be stressed that the dominant view was 
based Crst of all on the quoted source.
A  radical change in interpretation was proposed by Werner 
Flume, who gives several arguments that quod ex pretio habes can 
mean only “was du als Kaupreiserlös hast” (what you have as pur-
chase price”), not “was du von dem Kaufpreis noch hast” (what you 
still have from the purchase price). First of all, Flume points out 
that this text has nothing to do with the reduction of condictio only 
to the remaining enrichment17, but it refers to a situation where 
the object of undue performance and the object of its restitution 
are diXerent. Therefore ex pretio signiCes the origin – “as price” not 
“from the price”. The same meaning of ex pretio is proved in other 
12 Ibidem, pp. 20 ,.
13 Ibidem.
14 Ibidem, p. 84.
15 Ibidem, pp. 52 ,.
16 See: H. Siber, Retentio propter res donatas, in: Studi in onore di Salvatore 
Riccobono nel XL anno del suo insegnamento, t. 3, Palermo 1936, pp. 241 ,.; 
C. SanAlippo, Condictio indebiti I. Il fondamento dell’obbligazione da indebito, 
Milano 1943, p. 57; F. Schwarz, Die Grundlage der condictio im klassischen 
römischen Recht, Münster–Köln 1952, p. 307.
17 This remark was made earlier by F. Schulz, Die actiones in id quod pervenit 
u. in quantum locupletior factus est, Breslau 1905, p. 32.
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sources18. If compilers had wanted to say “what you have left from 
the price” they would have used in quantum locupletior factus est 
(as he became richer)19. Moreover, the condictio as a processual 
remedy aims at eBecting the return of a given object in concreto, 
so if it is for a certa res, the obligation is to return that thing itself. 
If the certa res has been sold, the price must be given back, since 
the price merely took its place. Flume argues that this position did 
not change in Justinian law. In his opinion, there was no contra-
diction, in fact, between classical and Justinian law in this matter. 
By the time of Justinian, the orientation of the condictio remained 
that of an action aimed at recovery of the object of the enrichment 
itself, that means it retained a concrete, rather than abstract, ori-
entation towards recovery of the net enrichment remaining in the 
defendant’s estate20. 
The interpretation of Flume is supported by Daniel P. Visser, 
though not without hesitation or reservations. In his opinion al-
though both above-mentioned translations are grammatically pos-
sible, “what you have left from the price” seems to be the most 
natural one. Notwithstanding after analysing Flume’s arguments he 
reaches the conclusion that “Flume is probably right”21. In Roman 
law the orientation of the condictiones was towards the recovery of 
that which had been given and not towards restoring the balance 
of enrichment remaining with the enrichment-debtor22. 
David A. Juentgen adheres to the interpretation of Flume too. 
He points out that the enrichment-debtor’s primary obligation 
is to return a given object in concreto. Consequently, where the 
enrichment-debtor has obtained speciWc goods he or she is un-
der an obligation to return these goods themselves. If they have
18 See D.6.1.29 (Pomp. 21 ad Q. Muc.).
19 W. Flume, Der Wegfall der Bereicherung in der Entwicklung vom römischem 
zum geltenden Recht, in: Festschrift für Hans Niedermeyer zum 70. Geburtstag, 
Göttingen 1953, pp. 105 B., cf. H. Niederländer, Die Bereicherungshaftung im 
klassischen römischen Recht, Weimar 1953, p. 6.
20 W. Flume, op.cit., pp. 103–133.
21 D. P. Visser, Responsability to Return Lost Enrichment, “Acta Iuridica”175, 
1992, p. 180.
22 Ibidem, p. 185.
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been sold, the price must be given back since the price merely 
took their place. If speci<c goods have been lost or destroyed, the 
enrichment-debtor is freed, for restitutio in concreto is no longer 
possible (impossibilium nulla est obligatio)23. 
Reinhard Zimmermann comes to the conclusion that quod ex 
pretio habes does not mean “what you have left from the price” 
but “what you have received as price” and Ulp. D.12.6.26.12 can 
therefore not be taken to have determined the content of enrich-
ment condictiones, on a gliding scale, according to the enrichment 
still extant at the time of litis contestatio. In his opinion in such 
a case the purchase price merely replaced the original object of the 
plaintiL’s condictio in the defendant’s property, which is based on 
the idea of surrogation. The condictio was an action stricti iuris and 
its formula did not, therefore, allow for any Oexibility. The defendant 
was condemned in either the sum or the value of the object that 
he had received. This solution of classical law remained in force 
at the time of Justinian24.
Although both above-mentioned translations of quod ex pre-
tio habes are grammatically possible, modern translations of the 
Digest still adhere to the long-adopted wording that the phrase 
means “what you have left from the price”, while the view in the 
Romanist literature prevailing after the fundamental work of Flume 
understands it as “what you have received as price”. It is essential 
therefore to <nd out if other sources of Roman law can support 
one of the competing views. Every scholar of Roman law must <rst 
make an important assumption which is crucial for the result of 
his research, namely that as a  rule the Roman sources should 
be treated as genuine (not interpolated), unless there are strong 
grounds to presume otherwise25. 
23 D.A. Juentgen, Unjusti7ed enrichment in New Zealand and in German 
Law, “Canterbury Law Review”, vol. 8, issue 3 (2002), pp. 526 L.
24 R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations. Roman Foundations of the Civil-
ian Tradition, Cape Town–Wetton–Johannesburg 1990, pp. 897–900. 
25 This attitude is stressed in modern research, see W. Bojarski, Remarks 
on Textual Reconstruction in Roman Law, in: Le droit et le monde contempo-
rain. Mélanges à la mémoire de Henryk Kupiszewski, ed. W. Wołodkiewicz and 
M. Zabłocka, Warsaw 1996, pp. 83–89.
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The general rule of restitution is proclaimed by Pomponius: 
D.12.6.7 (Pomp. 9 ad Sab.) “Quod indebitum per errorem solvitur, 
aut ipsum aut tantundem repetitur”.
This text was placed by the Justinian compilers in the Digest’s 
title De condictione indebiti, so the most important of Roman condic-
tiones26, but I think that it was applicable generally for condictio as 
the unjustiQed enrichment action, not only in the case of condictio 
indebiti. Pomponius says that when debt not due is discharged 
in error, recovery is either of what is actually given or its value 
in money. In the case of money received as a purchase price it 
means that the recipient should restore exactly the same coins27 
or if he has consumed them or lost them in any way, their value 
in other coins. Nothing in this text suggests that this obligation 
is reduced in any way. No circumstances that can occur after the 
undue performance and change the recipient’s position are taken 
into account28. Therefore, the source can be understood in two 
ways. First, it should be taken as a neutral one, it could be said 
merely to state the basic principle that the enrichment-debtor has 
to give that which he or she received or its value, and not what 
should happen when the enrichment-debtor has neither the ob-
ject itself nor its value in his or her patrimony29. Second, the text 
suggests that if the recipient for any reason has a lesser quantity 
of the fungible things than he originally received he is still obliged 
to give the original amount of goods (tantundem) back, not only 
that which he has left from the goods. So, in the case of money its 
26 In fact, there should be no doubts that exactly this condictio was the 
most important, cf. D. Liebs, The History of Roman Condictio up to Justinian, 
in: The Legal Mind. Essays for Tony Honoré, ed. N. MacCormick and P. Birks, 
Oxford 1986, pp. 163 \. 
27 In ancient times people attached importance to coins, so the giver Qrst 
sought to reclaim exactly the same coins he had given and if it was impos-
sible because of consumption he could demand their value. See M. Kaser, Das 
Geld im römischen Sachenrecht, TR 29, 1961, p. 171; J. G. Fuchs, Consumptio 
nummorum (discepatio nondum consumpta), in: Mèlanges Philippe Meylan, vol. I: 
Droit romain, Lausanne 1963, p. 126; A. Wacke, Die Zahlung mit fremden Geld. 
Zum BegriJ des „pecuniam consumere“, BIDR 79, 1976, p. 54. 
28 D.P. Visser, op.cit., p. 176.
29 Ibidem, p. 177. 
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consumption does not have any impact on the recipient’s duty. To 
my view although both interpretations are admissible, the second 
seems slightly more correct. One can assume that if Pomponius 
wanted to limit the obligation of restitution he would do it expressly. 
Further guidance can be drawn from the sources regarding do-
nation in contemplation of death (donatio mortis causa). This dona-
tion could take various forms30; however, they all have one thing in 
common – in certain circumstances the giver could claim the object 
of donation back, especially where his life was not in danger any 
more, e.g. he had recovered from a serious disease, or he outlived 
the receiver31. For that purpose he could take advantage of condictio 
ob rem (later known as condictio causa data causa non secuta)32. 
From the very nature of this donation it appears that the problem 
of scope of the recipient’s duty of restitution was of particular im-
portance. This issue was tackled by Iulian: D.39.6.37.1 (Ulp. 15 
ad l. Iul. et Pap.) “Iulianus ait: si quis servum mortis causa sibi 
donatum vendiderit et hoc vivo donatore fecerit, pretii condictionem 
donator habebit, si convaluisset et hoc donator elegerit. alioquin 
et ipsum servum restituere compellitur”.
30 There is neither place here not any point in presenting those forms, for 
details see: M. Amelotti, La „donatio mortis causa“ in diritto romano, Milano 
1953, passim; P. Simonius, Die Donatio mortis causa im klassischen römischen 
Recht, Basel 1958, passim; G.G. Archi, La donazione. Corso di diritto romano, 
Milano 1960, passim; S. Di Paola, Donatio mortis causa. Corso di diritto romano, 
Napoli 1969, passim; C. Tort-Martorell LLabrés, La revocación de la donatio 
mortis causa en el derecho romano clásico, Madrid 2003, passim; P. Jung, Das 
Rückforderungsrecht des Schenkers mortis causa Zugleich eine Abhandlung zu 
D 39,6,39 und D 39,6,35,2–3, in: Pichonnaz. Spuren des römischen Rechts – 
Festschrift für Bruno Huwiler zum 65. Geburtstag, Bern 2007; M. Sobczyk, 
Darowizna na wypadek śmierci w projekcie zmiany kodeksu cywilnego a rzym-
ska donatio mortis causa [Donation in contemplation of death in the draft of the 
amendment to the Polish civil code and Roman donatio mortis causa, in: Interes 
prywatny, a interes publiczny w prawie rzymskim, ed. B. Sitek, K. Naumowicz, 
K. Zaworska, Olsztyn 2012, pp. 231–243.
31 See D.39.5.1pr. (Iul. 17 dig.), D.39.6.27 (Marc. 5 regur.), D.39.6.35.2–3 
(Paul. 6 ad l. Iul. et Pap.), I.2.7.2; C.4.6.6. 
32 On this particular [eld of application of condictio ob rem see M. Sobczyk, 
Świadczenie w zamierzonym celu, który nie został osiągnięty. Studium z prawa
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Iulian says: if someone sells a slave given to him mortis causa 
and does so while the donor is still alive, the donor will be able to 
bring a condictio for the price33 of the slave if he gets better and if 
he chooses to do so. Otherwise, the donee is compelled to return 
the slave himself34. In fact, the situation referred to by Iulian is very 
similar to the initial one described above. Someone sells a slave 
received by means of donatio mortis causa whom he is obliged to 
restore in a possible case when the giver recovers and decides to 
claim the donation back. One important diAerence is that this time 
the source tells nothing about the amount of the price received, 
so one can assume that it was the market price. However, the es-
sential thing is that here it is not written quod ex pretio habes but 
the condictio is for pretium without any sign of its reduction, so 
the problem of loss of the price is not taken into consideration. 
Naturally, it does necessarily mean that this problem is completely 
irrelevant, but the more convincing interpretation is that the re-
cipient has to pay the price received, not only that what he has 
left from the price. It seems that if the obligation of restitution was 
restricted to remaining enrichment Iulian’s response would indicate 
this solution expressly. 
The same conclusion stems from another of Iulian’s solutions: 
D.39.6.19 (Iul. 80 dig.): “Si Qlio familias res mortis causa data 
fuerit et convaluisset, donator actionem de peculio cum patre ha-
bet: at si pater familias, cum mortis causa donationem accepisset, 
in adoptionem se dederit, res ipsa a donatore repetitur. nec huic 
similis est is, qui rem, quam mortis causa acceperat, alii porro 
dederit: nam donator huic non rem, sed pretium eius condiceret”. 
Iulian deals here with three cases all concerning donatio mortis 
causa. If property has been given to a son-in-power and the donor 
gets better, he can bring an action on peculium against the father. 
rzymskiego [Performance made for a speci;c purpose that was not achieved. 
Study in Roman law], Toruń 2012, pp. 168–177. 
33 In the above-mentioned translation edited by A. Watson “value” is used 
instead of “price”.
34 J. D. Harke is right to remark that this solution is in favour of the 
condictio-creditor not the debtor, see J.D. Harke, Das klassische römische 
Kondiktionensystem, IURA 2003, p. 80.
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If the head of the household receives a gift mortis causa and then 
allows himself to be adopted, the property itself can be reclaimed 
by the donor. So, in both cases the object of the action is the given 
property itself35. The case of someone who receives a gift mortis 
causa and then gives it to somebody else is not similar, since the 
donor would in that case bring a condictio against the latter not for 
the property, but for its value. In the third case the donee is unable 
to give the property itself back because he has already given it to 
someone else; that is why the condictio is not for the property but 
for its value. It should be stressed, however, that even the third 
case diBers considerably from the initial one, because this time 
the object that should be given back is not sold, so no price is 
received in exchange, but is merely given to another person. Due 
to the fact that the donee always has to take into consideration 
that the donor can demand the given property, he is not released 
from the obligation of restitution, but the object of this obligation is 
diBerent from the object of donation: instead of the property itself 
its value must be given back. It is obvious that in such a situation 
there is no room for the problem of loss of the money received as 
price, since there is no price.
Another similar case is tackled by Paulus: D.39.6.39 (Paul. 17 
ad Plaut.): “Si is, cui mortis causa servus donatus est, eum manu-
misit, tenetur condictione in pretium servi, quoniam scit posse sibi 
condici, si convaluerit donator”. 
If someone who has been given a slave mortis causa manumits 
that slave, he is liable to a condictio for the value of the slave, since 
he knows that a condictio can be brought against him in the event 
of the donor’s getting better. This case is similar both to the initial 
one and to the last one mentioned by Iulian, but this time the slave 
given mortis causa was neither sold nor given but manumitted. As 
a result, the restitution of the given property itself is impossible 
as in the cases of sale or further donation; that is why only the 
value of the slave can be claimed. The words pretium servi must be 
understood here as the value of the slave, not the price for him, be-
35 In fact the two cases are also diBerent in some aspects that are not 
interesting here, about the diBerences, see P. Simonius, op.cit., pp. 177 B.
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cause the slave was manumitted not sold36. This solution con6rms 
the general rule aliud praestemus, aliud condicimus but it does not 
deal with the particular problem of loss of the enrichment. It is 
notable that Paulus justi6es his view writing that this obligation 
is imposed on the donee because he knows that a condictio can 
be brought against him in the event of the donor’s getting better. 
A similar solution was proposed by Paulus in the case of servus 
indebitus: D.12.6.65.8 (Paul. 17 Plaut.) “Si servum indebitum tibi 
dedi eumque manumisisti, si sciens hoc fecisti, teneberis ad pretium 
eius, si nesciens, non teneberis, sed propter operas eius liberti et 
ut hereditatem eius restituas”. 
If somebody gives a slave not due and the recipient manumits 
him, Paul says that the recipient will be liable for his value if he 
acted knowingly; if unknowingly, he will not be liable, though he 
must make restitution in respect of his day works as a freedman 
and rights of succession to him. The recipient’s knowledge is the 
essential precondition of his liability: if he is aware that the slave 
was not owed to him he does not have any liability, except the day 
works (operae liberti) and rights of succession. If he knows that 
fact, he is liable for the slave’s value37 without any reduction. This 
time the recipient does not receive anything for the manumission 
of the slave, so there is no purchase price that can take the place 
of the thing, therefore the principle of surrogation is inapplicable 
here. In consequence, there is neither room nor need to discuss 
the problem of the partial or total loss of the purchase price. The 
recipient is either liable for the value of the slave or not liable at 
all; partial liability does not come into account. Since the manu-
mission of the slave, so a res in specie, amounts to the total loss of 
the enrichment, the recipient’s liability depends on his knowledge 
about the relevant fact of the undue character of performance that 
he previously received. 
There is also another of Iulian’s solutions regarding a similar 
problem, mentioned by his pupil Africanus: D.12.1.23 (Afric. 2
36 P. Simonius, op.cit., pp. 176 T.; J.D. Harke, op.cit., p. 80.
37 In my opinion since the slave is manumitted not sold the term pretium 
should be translated as value, not price.
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quaest.) “Si eum servum, qui tibi legatus sit, quasi mihi legatum 
possederim et vendiderim, mortuo eo posse te mihi pretium con-
dicere iulianus ait, quasi ex re tua locupletior factus sim”.
This text does not deal with the object of undue performance 
but the object of legatum, i.e. a slave, who was in the possession 
of a person who bona +de regarded himself as legatarius. If the 
slave is sold the true legatarius can claim the price, because the 
possessor becomes richer. This obligation exists even if the slave 
then dies38. Nothing in this text is said about the amount of the 
price or its consumption. Iulian does not suggest any reduction of 
the amount of money that should be restored. In fact, it can still 
be said that the price is given back instead of the thing, but if the 
restitution could be lower than the price received Iulian would take 
it into account. 
None of these sources deals exactly with the same problem which 
is tackled by Celsus and Ulpian in D.12.6.26.12; however, they 
relate to similar, or even very similar, issues. This observation does 
not exclude the prudent conclusion that in the case of the sale of 
a slave not owed for a low price the recipient acting in good faith 
was obliged to hand over what he had received as the purchase 
price not only the existing enrichment. Apart from that problem, 
in the case of D.12.6.26.12 it is diPcult to Qnd any important R
reasons why the original classical wording had to be interpolated 
by the Justinian compilers, nota bene exactly in the opposite di-
rection. Other sources at least do not support the suspicion of 
interpolation and in consequence do not support the view of there 
being a radical diUerence between classical and Justinian law. In 
my opinion the Justinian concept of unjust enrichment was not 
radically diUerent from the classical one and I am not convinced 
by the view that the compilers relied so strongly on the doctrine 
of equity that the only admissible solution was an obligation to 
restore only the remaining enrichment. 
The two grammatically possible translations of quod ex pretio 
habes illustrate the two views taken in the literature. It is interest-
38 In fact the existence of the obligation is independent from the existence 
of the slave, cf. J.D. Harke, op.cit., p. 82.
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ing that the translations of D.12.6.26.12 cited above are di7erent 
from the currently prevailing view, that the phrase means ‘what 
you have received as price’. This prevailing view complies with the 
general opinion today that both in classical law and in Justinian 
law the enrichment liability as a  rule was not restricted to the 
enrichment existing at the time of litis contestatio39. Proponents 
of the view argue that the enrichment-debtor’s primary obligation 
was to return a given object in concreto. Consequently, where the 
enrichment-debtor had obtained speciJc goods (res in specie) he 
or she was under an obligation to return those goods themselves. 
If they had been sold, the full price had to be given back since the 
price merely took their place. If speciJc goods had been lost or 
destroyed without the enrichment-debtor’s fault or delay, he was 
freed, because the restitution of the object in concreto was no longer 
possible (impossibilium nulla est). If the debtor acted in bad faith 
he remained obliged to pay the value of the thing lost40. If, however, 
money or other fungibles had been lost the enrichment-debtor 
would not be freed, for fungibles cannot perish: these things can 
always be substituted41. So, when corn given when not due was 
consumed, its value was recoverable42. The receipt of something not 
due was likened to mutuum (the contract of loan) by Gaius, who 
stated that when things such as money, wine, oil, corn, bronze, 
silver and gold were lent, not the actual things that were lent, but 
their equivalent had to be returned43. 
Roman law knew only a  few exceptions to these rules. In the 
case of pupillus who had concluded a contract without the author-
ity of his tutor and for this reason, on the basis of the rescript of 
Antoninus Pius, was liable only in quantum locupletior factus est at 
39 H. Niederländer, op.cit., p. 1; W. Flume, op.cit., p. 109; B. Kupisch, Um-
gerechtfertigte Bereicherung. Geschichtliche Entwicklungen, Heidelberg 1987, 
pp. 1 7.; R. Zimmermann, op.cit., p. 897; M. Kaser, R. Knütel, Römisches 
Recht, München 2003, p. 306; S. Hähnchen, op.cit., pp. 22 7.
40 H. Niederländer, op.cit., p. 2; R. Zimmermann, op.cit., p. 898.
41 D.19.5.25 (Marc. 3 reg.).
42 D.12.6.65.6 (Paul. 17 ad Plaut.).
43 G.3.91, cf. I.3.14.1.
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the time of litis contestatio44. In the case of a prohibited donation 
between husband and wife when the donor claimed it back the 
donee’s liability was limited only to the remaining enrichment45. 
Likewise, when the possessor of an inheritance in good faith was 
sued by means of hereditatis petitio and afterwards had to restore 
the property to the heirs, he restored it in the present condition, 
not in the original condition when he had received it46. 
Even the above-mentioned rule governing the loss of res in specie 
cannot be seen as a proof of the limited unjustiFed enrichment 
liability. The fact that the receiver was released from his duty to 
restore the thing when it was lost without his fault does not mean 
that only the enrichment existing at the time of litis contestatio was 
taken into account. This rule is an emanation of the fundamental 
assumption that the fate of the object received in the patrimony 
of the enriched person determined the obligation of restitution. 
When the obligation became impossible without the person’s fault 
it extinguished. Contrary to the contemporary law the enrichment 
was not related to the whole patrimony of the enriched person, but 
only to the particular asset47.
After this short research I have come to the conclusion that the 
modern translation of D.12.6.26.12 should take into account the 
currently prevailing view on the interpretation of quod ex pretio 
habes, because this view is based in other sources.
44 D.26.8.1pr. (Ulp. 1 ad Sab.), D.26.8.5pr. (Ulp. 40 ad Sab.). H. Nieder-
länder, op.cit., pp. 11 W.; W. Flume, op.cit., p. 124; E.H. Kaden, Das Schriftum 
der Jahre 1950–1953 zur römischen Bereicherungslehre, ZSS no 71, 1954, 
pp. 580–583; B. Kupisch, op.cit., pp. 1 W.; R. Zimmermann, op.cit., pp. 896 W.
45 W. Flume, op.cit., p. 116 W.; H. Niederländer, op.cit., pp. 35 W.; K. Mi-
sera, Der Bereicherungsgedanke bei der Schenkung unter Ehegatten, Köln–Wien 
1974, passim.
46 D.5.3.20.6c (Ulp. 15 ad ed.); H. Niederländer, op.cit., pp. 154 W.; M. Mül-
ler-Ehlen, Hereditatis petitio. Studien zur Leistung auf fremde Schuld und zur 
Bereicherungshaftung in der römischen Erbschaftsklage, Köln–Weimar–Wien 
1998, passim.
47 Cf. W. Flume, p. 121.
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STRESZCZENIE
Quod ex pretio habes – kilka uwag na temat zakresu 
odpowiedzialności z tytułu bezpodstawnego wzbogacenia 
w prawie rzymskim
W artykule zajmuję się wybranymi aspektami ustania wzbogacenia w pra-
wie rzymskim. Analizuję szczególny problem sprzedaży w dobrej wierze 
osobie trzeciej korzyści majątkowej uzyskanej cudzym kosztem bez pod-
stawy prawnej. Problem ten został poruszony przez Ulpiana w D.12.6.26.12 
(Ulp. 26 ad ed.), gdzie jurysta ten użył sformułowania quod ex pretio habes, 
które może być dwojako interpretowane: „to, co pozostało ci z ceny”, lub „to, 
co otrzymałeś jako cenę”. W przekładach Digestów stosowana jest pierwsza 
interpretacja, podczas gdy w literaturze romanistycznej przeważa druga. 
Przedstawiam poglądy wyrażone w literaturze i analizuję relewantne źródła 
prawa rzymskiego w poszukiwaniu wskazówek, która z tych interpretacji 
jest właściwa. Ostatecznie dochodzę do wniosku, że współczesne przekłady 
wzmiankowanego fragmentu powinny uwzględnić pogląd dominujący w na-
uce, albowiem znajduje on potwierdzenie w innych źródłach.
Słowa kluczowe: prawo rzymskie; bezpodstawne wzbogacenie; utrata 
wzbogacenia; quod ex pretio habes 
SUMMARY
Quod ex pretio habes – some remarks on the scope  
of unjustiVed enrichment liability in Roman law
In this paper I deal with selected aspects of the concept of loss of en-
richment in Roman law. I analyse a particular problem where someone 
acting in good faith has transferred to a third person a thing of another 
which he has previously received without legal ground. It was tackled by 
Ulpian in D.12.6.26.12 (Ulp. 26 ad ed.), where the jurist used the crucial 
phrase quod ex pretio habes, which can be interpreted in two ways: “what 
you still have left from the price” or “what you have received as price”. In 
modern translations of Digest the former interpretation is used, while in 
the Romanist literature the latter prevails. I present the views expressed 
in literature and analyse relevant sources of Roman law in search for
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clues which of those interpretations is the proper one. Finally, I come to 
the conclusion that the modern translation of D.12.6.26.12 should take 
into account the currently prevailing view on the interpretation of quod 
ex pretio habes, because this view is based in other sources. 
Keywords: Roman law; unjustiFed enrichment; loss of enrichment; quod 
ex pretio habes 
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